Initially, the existence of capitalization into land values was thought to substantiate Tiebout's claims of efficiency (Oates (1969) ). Edel and Sciar (19714) clarified this issue by noting that supply conditions were crucial for capitalization to occur. Capitalization into land values could occur only in a short-run disequilibrium context when there was a shortage of a given type of' community. Their work inspired a flurry of empirical investigations on this topic (Meadows (1976) , Rosen and Fullerton (1977) , etc.). The key implications were: (1) land value capitalization implies a suboptimal provision of local government services exists; (2) no such capitalization implies that efficiency is achieved; and, (3) declining levels of capitalization through time imply that an efficient Tiebout equilibrium is being approached. Epple, Zelenitz, and Visscher (1978) and Epple and Zelenitz (1981) provided further theoretical clarification and critiques of tests of' the Tiebout hypothesis. Their works highlight that if residents are mobile but jurisdictional boundaries are fixed, an Oates-type housing price regression is really a test of the equal utility hypothesis, not of the Tiebout hypothesis. State: differently, the test is whether housing prices (representing nontraded goods) adjust to compensate for differing fiscal -2-climates in order to keep utility constant across jurisdictions. Edel and Sclar (19714) were correct about no land price capitalization if a full Tiebout equilibrium included variable jurisdictional boundaries. Otherwise, it was possible for the local government sector to extract rents from landowners.
In the public choice literature, the issue of efficient provision of local services usually was debated in the context of control by the local bureaucracy versus the median voter. Niskanen (1975) and Rorner and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) argued that various factors (reversion rules for example) could allow bureaucrats to control agendas and not provide the tax-service package desired by the median voter. In a related context, Courant, Grarnlich, and Rubinfeld (1979) analyzed how a local public service union with some monopoly power might also be able to successfully capture economic rents. They concluded that highly mobile residents substantially limited the scope for successful rent-seeking behavior.
While the public choice researchers have cogently argued that bureaucratic behavior can lead to a suboptimal provision of local public goods and services, neither they nor other urban economists have adequately analyzed the implications that body of work has for capitalization into land values or possibly public sector wages. The next section considers the effects of introducing a rent-seeking bureaucracy in a Tiebout model. Section 3: Economic Rents, Capitalization, and Bureaucratic Behavior in a Tiebout Model
In the standard Tiebout model in full equilibrium there is no role for a rent-seeking public sector. However, a long-term Tiebout equilibrium probably is not the normal state of affairs in a dynamic urban setting. If excess demand appears for a given type of community in a metropolitan area, the supply response is likely to be very slow. The geographical compactness of most urban areas makes expansion or entry of communities difficult if not impossible. Henderson (1985) in particular has made the question of whether jurisdictional boundaries are mobile a matter of current debate. If they are not mobile in the short run then economic rents may be available. Further, if excess demand tends to persist in this market, the amount of economic rents available could be quite large. This increases the likelihood that various interest groups will attempt to capture the rents and reinforces the need to control for the possible effects of local bureaucracy rent-seeking on -capitalization into land prices. The familiar Tiebout model outlined below highlights the relationship between capitalization and rent-seeking.
A number of assumptions underlie Tiebout's famous result. They are (a) mobility for individuals, (b) knowledge on the part of consumers of all relevant opportunities (everyone knows the entry price or each type of community), Cc) existence of sufficient numbers of communities to insure competition among them and to insure the availability of communities for each individual's tastes, (d) no differences across communities from location restrictions due to accessibility to employment centers, (e) no externalities among communities from public services, and (f) the optimal city size exists for each individual taste pattern and communities try to achieve the optimal size so as to rniniize costs.
Each city is assumed to produce some public service S where (1) S f (N, L) with N land and E labor.
For city A,
SA f(NA, LA)
_14_
Cities differ by the quality-adjusted amount of the service they provide. To obtain 5A' an individual must occupy a site in jurisdiction A. All sites are identical. For simplicity let construction costs be zero. Figure 1 represents the demand for sites in a single type or class of community, A.
The average cost of providing the service is paid through a local property tax, the only local tax. The tax burden appears as a price to the residents. Given the assumptions listed above, average cost, marginal cost, and the tax price per site are identical in the long run so the equilibrium at T is efficient and is the equilibrium number of sites in the type A communities. Edel and Sciar (19711) correctly point out that there is no capitalization into land value in this situation even with consumer surplus LWT. There are a sufficient number of towns so that any individual can find a site in an acceptable community with or without service quality 3A• The marginal consumer is just indifferent between living in this type A community and the next best alternative type community. This person will not be willing to pay more than $W which equals the net present value of the tax burden in a type A city. No capitalization can occur because that would raise the entry price above $W. Edel and Sciar (19714) highlight that capitalization is crucially dependent upon su:ly conditions. In Figure 2 , there is a new supply schedule indicating that c-y q5 sites in type A communities are available. Marginal willingness to pay to live in a type A city is now $X per site.
Capitalization res.its ". . . assuming prices were set equal to the average . . . cos:" of producing the service SA (Edel and Sclar (19714, p. 91414) Assume that such a measure indicates that government wages are higher than expected in a particular community given the wage structure in the private sector. It would not necessarily be the case that local government employees are consuming rents. Other plausible explanations for the relatively high wages are that these workers have a higher productivity -than is captured by the explanatory variables in the wage regressions but which is observed by the community or that there are unaccounted for disamnenities associated with the job and/or city. Fortunately, we can discriminate between these possibilities in (3) because the explanations imply distinct effects when the wage measure is added to a land value capitalization regression.
In this respect, it is important to realize that data on services in particular usually are far from ideal in capitalization studies. A standard practice is to use expenditures by type of service to proxy for output of publicly produced goods and services. Not being able to control effectively for real services provision means the coefficient on BR and the impacts on other coefficients in (3) must be interpreted with care.
The wage rate premium coefficient should differ depending upon the source of the differential. If successful bureaucracy rent-seeking occurs, the coefficient will be negative, holding taxes and the services proxies constant. This is because a lower effective level of services is implied from the situation where total tax revenues remain constant while more of those revenues are diverted to public sector wages. Residents have to be compensated through lower land prices. In contrast, if the higher wages are payments for higher productivity or for some uncontrolled for disamenity, there is no implicit reduction in effective services provision, with no compensating land price change needed to keep utilities constant across jurisdictions. Thus, the productivity explanation implies a zero rather than a negative coefficient on the wage premium measure.
Including a control for public sector rent-grabbing should also influence the coefficients on the other fiscal variables. For example, consider the interpretation of the coefficient on a tax variable when some measure for abnormal wages is not included in the specification. As the tax rate is increased holding the real services output proxy (or proxies) constant, two possible scenarios arise•. One is that the added tax revenues go to improving genuinely desired services which are not fully picked up by the services proxies. In this case, there is no reason for land values to change in order to equate the utilities of mobile workers across jurisdictions.
Alternatively, the added revenues could go to (say) increased bureaucratic wages (i.e., the entry price is raised above $W in Figure 2 ). In this situation, land values would have to fall to compensate residents for the higher tax burden. The coefficient on the tax rate in this situation reflects the combined influences of' these two possibilities.6
Now, consider the effect of including the wage premium measure as an estimate of BR in (3). Assume first that the measure accurately reflects rent consumption and not something such as differential productivity. The coefficient on the tax rate now more closely reflects the influence of uncontrolled for changes in real services output and should have a coefficient closer to zero (if the added real services output from the increased taxes are genuinely desired by the population). However, if the wage differential measure is picking up (say) unobserved productivity differentials, including the variable in the regression should leave the tax coefficient unaffected as long as the wage differentials are exactly compensating (if the equal utility hypothesis holds, of course). Thus, it should also be possible to discriminate between the two general explanations for abnormal wages through their impacts on the tax rate coefficients.
Admittedly, the data requirements of this proposed test are substantial. In addition to the local fiscal information normally used, micro-level wage, demographic, and job-related data on public and private sector workers across a metropolitan area are also needed. However, -considering the claims for bureaucracy agenda control in the public choice literature and wage premium findings in public/private labor market studies, future research should work on compiling the data needed to adequately test for the effects of possible public sector rent capture on local land markets.
Unfortunately, we were not able to find or readilydevelop a sufficiently detailed micro data set on workers across jurisdictions within a given urban area to be able to reliably estimate public/private sector wage differentials. However, we were able to estimate an expanded Oates-type capitalization equation on a cross section of thirty-seven central cities throughout the U.S. This approach does pose some problems such as how to control for interrgional amenity differences not faced in the standard land value capitalizati:r work.7 Interjurisdictional mobility is also a key assumption in our analysis and mobility may not be sufficiently high across widely dispersed c:zies except in the very long run. Consequently, our results can only he viewed as suggestive. Finer intraurban data sets will have to be developed in the future to perform a more powerful test.8
Data on work€s in the thirty-seven cities in our sample came from the May 1977 Current F:ulation Survey (CPS). While the CPS does identify workers residing in the ce:ral city part versus the rest of the SMSA (there are no -12-other jurisdiction identifiers besides those for major central cities), the limited number of complete observations on public sector employees even in this large data base forced the use of' both central city and non-central city observations when calculating wage differentials.
The wage premium proxy for the BR variable in (3) was calculated by following an estimation strategy used by the authors in another paper (see Tracy and Gyourko (1986) ). There we modelled four separate labor markets--private nonunion sector, private union sector, public nonunion sector, and public union sector. The "potential" wage for the th worker in the population in each of these four labor markets (j 1, 2, 3, 14) is given by (ha) in W1
X.181 + U.1 (private nonunion) (14b) in W12 X2B2 + u2
(private union) (Ltc) in W3 X33 + u.3
(public nonunion) (Ltd) in W XjhBh + u (public union) where: u -N(Oc); Using the indicator function in (5), we proceeded to estimate the wage equation in each market using the generalized two-stage procedure for switching regressions with an endogenous switching rule discussed in Lee (1982) . Consistent estimates are obtained with this procedure.9
The coefficient vectors (6) of the two public sector wage equations generated by the two-stage estimation of (14) and (5) were used to compute the expected wages of individual local public employees in each city (WexP1) as defined in (6), (6) Wexp. .
8!X. where i indexes the workers, j 3 (public nonunion sector) or j 11 (public union sector), and and t3 are the same as 63 in (14c) and 614 in (11d) except each contains an added selectivity parameter. These coefficient vectors include the standard human capital and demographic variables (education, experience, race, sex, marital status, etc.), a cost-of-living index that varies by city,1° regional dummies, dummies by type and level of government worker,11 as well as the selection bias term.
The wage differential for a specific local public employee (Wdif1) is calculated as the difference between the employee's actual wage (Wact1) and his or her expected wage (Wexp) as shown in (7).
Wdif.
Wact. . -Wexp.
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This differential measures how different are a specific local public employee's actual wages from what would be expected for that employee in the same job based on the coefficient vector generated using all the public workers in the sample. For (say) a local police officer in New York City, the measure reflects how different are his or her wages from what a similarly looking police officer would expect to earn on average throughout all the cities (controlling for cost-of-living differences and broad regional amenities, too).
The estimated public sector wage differential for a city is the average of these individual local public worker differentials in percentage terms.
This average is then used as the BR variable in (3) and (8).
The capitalization equation estimated is given in (8), Table 1 .
Column one of Table 2 shows the regression results for (8) without any bureaucratic rents variable. We included both effective property tax rates and wage and/or payroll tax rates to capture the local tax environment. Over one-third of the cities in the sample use a wage or income tax. The local income tax rate has a negative coefficient and is significant at or near the .10 level. The property tax rate has a small coefficient and is never significantly different from zero. Residents appear to have to be compensated through lower property prices for higher wage taxes but not for higher property taxes. Local per capita spending has a significantly positive effect on local property prices. Other variables thought to affect the level of demand such as mean per capita income (FAMINC79) also significantly influence property values in the anticipated direction. An increasing number of heating degree days (HEAT) has a negative but not always highly significant effect on housing values. The percentage of relatively new housing in the city is included as a control for the quality of the housing stock, and it always has a significantly positive effect on median property value.12 Adding in the wage differential proxy for BR changes virtually none of the regression results in a significant manner as the second column of Table 2 shows. The BR coefficient is negative but it is estimated very imprecisely.
These results are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that measured wage differentials reflect primarily unmeasured productivity of public sector workers and that public bureaucracy rent consumption is not significantly influencing land prices across major cities although we have noted the power of this test may not be very high.
Column three of Table 2 presents the regression results when the wage differential data underlying the BR variable are represented in another form. Instead of using the city averages of (7) directly, a dummy variable for BR was constructed. If the average differential for the city was greater than one standard deviation above the mean differential for all the cities, then BR was set equal to one. Otherwise, BR was set equal to zero.
We did this for a variety of reasons. First, we suspected that the relatively large measured differentials in some cities were more likely to be indicative of some successful rent capture rather than primarily reflecting unmeasured productivity differences across workers or other noise in the data possibly involving factors such as uncontrolled for amenity differences.
Second, the marginal homeowner may have great difficulty in accurately perceiving whether a relatively small differential represents pure rent consumption by public officials or whether the differential reflects compensation for scie uncontrolled for productivity or disarnenity associated with the job or city. In a sense, the marginal homeowner has a similar problem to the ecor.ometrician in that not everything can be observed so that the smaller the differential the more difficult it is to tell whether it is deserved or not. Only large wage differentials may be accurately perceived as rent-grabbing on the part of local public employees.13
Third, we suspected that if local public employees were able to appropriate some of the excess return arising from a shortage situation, they
would not consume the rents solely through higher wages. Some of the excess return may be being consumed through abnormally high nonwage benefits involving pension plans, sick leave, vacations, etc. Various other nonwage amenities directly enhancing the workplace environment (e.g. plush offices) may also be greater.
vlhen the actual estimated wage differentials from (7) The coefficient on BR in column three is negative and significant at. the .05 level.1 This provides the first indication we are aware of that potential residents may be being compensated through lower property prices in cities where local public employees earn substantially higher wages than similar local public employees earn on average in other cities.15
The coefficient implies that median property values were depressed by 29 percent in those seven cities with measured wage differentials in excess of -17-one standard deviation above the sample average differential. The size of this effect in absolute terms is easily calculated in (9) and (10),
IPV -(.29)IPV APV or IPV APV/.71, where APV is the actual median property value as defined in Table 1 , and IPV is the implied median property value in the absence of the rent-grabbing local public employees. Further,
PV APV -IPV with PV being the amount of the estimated decline in median house value.
Obviously, the estimation of' (10) For Chicago, the city closest to the average median housing price among the seven relatively high wage cities, the value of LPWR was approximately $8155. This is 52 percent of the average Chicago local public employee's annual wage income.17 Assuming benefits are approximately one-third of wage income,18 the value of rent consumption for a local public worker in Chicago equalled approximately 39 percent of the total wage-benefit package. While these estimates are high, they are not completely unbelievable. In particular, they should not readily be interpreted as implying that the wagebenefit package for Chicago city employees would necessarily be 39 percent lower in the absence of any rent-grabbing.19 Such simple ceteris paribus experiments with a wage-benefit package may not be appropriate if everything else cannot really be held constant. In this respect, it is important to remember that rents may be being consumed in other forms (overstaffing for example) which are picked up in the BR coefficient used to generate PV in (11).
Detroit was the city with the lowest median property value ($18,1142).
Its value for LPWR was $8337. This amounted to 147 percent of annual wage income and 35% of' an estimated wage-benefit package. The results on LPWR for Anaheim, the city with the highest median house value among the seven cities, are an order of magnitude too large to be believable. The LPWR value was $50,731. This was 305 percent of annual wage income and 229 percent of wages and benefits. The 29 percent lower median house value implied by the BR coefficient may not be very relevant for Anaheim. Anaheim's observed median house price is in excess of two standard deviations above the sample average median house price. Anaheim is also an outlier in the number of houses per local public worker. It had almost twenty-four houses per full-time local public employee in 1976 while the average for the other cities was ten.
Additionally, it could just be a statistical quirk of the sample that Anaheim appears as a city with relatively high local public wages.2°W
hile better local data on jurisdictions in individual metropolitan areas are clearly needed, the results in Table 2 and in footnote 15 do provide the first empirical evidence that local public sector rent seeking may be influencing prices across land markets. We also believe that our approach provides a sensible way to generate an estimate of public sector rent consumption and that our estimation strategy can effectively discriminate between real rent grabbing and noise in the data.21
If public sector rent grabbing is occurring, it should have important implications for the local regulatory process and, hence, for the political and economic development of a city. There is an interesting political economy of the battle for WXYZ in Figure 2 anytime landowners cannot easily prohibit others' rent-seeking behavior. Consequently, it is important to realize that the regulatory process can be used in various ways to capture rents or split them with other parties. Indeed, legislated reversion rules have been viewed as a mechanism to prevent homeowners constituting an electoral majority from easily controlling a bureaucracy through the ballot box.
Land use controls are another interesting example. They can be very effective at restricting entry, helping to perpetuate any excess demand condition. Any interest group receiving rents would have an incentive to support adoption of this regulation. Groups not currently capturing rents might also favor such supply restrictions if they believe there is some positive probability that fortunes will change, allowing them to obtain some of the excess returns in the future.
While land use controls act as barriers to entry, different price-setting regulations such as property tax rate caps and rent controls can be viewed at least partially as rent-splitting devices. Some type of rent-splitting solution will arise anytime a single group is not able to dominate the other groups and reap all of rectangle WXYZ.
Property tax rate caps could set the price of a site anywhere between $W and $X. If the local public bureaucracy has some monopoly power, possibly due to labor union power or special reversion-type rules fostering agenda control, property tax rate caps may be voted by the residents to restrict bureaucracy rent-seeking. In Figure 3 , tax rates are set so that the site price can rise no higher than $(X-B). Figure   3 .
Rent controls can serve a similar rent-splitting function. In excess demand situations like that described above, renters and the public bureaucracy both might favor rent controls. The bureaucracy could offer lower publicly provided services prices to insure against recall along with rent controls to limit capitalization into land values. In Figure 3 , $(X-B) is again the effective tax price of a site in the community with rent controls such that the rental ceiling is equal to the long-run price of housing services. In this case, the landlords reap none of' the excess return from the shortage but they still will offer housing services in the city because a competitive return is being received. With the site price set at $(X-B), the distance B is the payment (in terms of lower service prices) to residents as that suggested by Epple, Visscher, and Zelenitz (1978) will have to account for the added complications of public sector rent-seeking highlighted here.
Finally, a new approach to test for the presence of bureaucracy rentseeking was proposed. The test involved an expanded Oates-type capitalization regression. The test exploits the fact that such rent-seeking should have identifiable effects on land value capitalization assuming mobility is high enough that a given individual can achieve equal utility in any locality within some urban area. Although Epple and Zelenitz (1981) have pointed out that the Oates regression generally does not adequately test the Tiebout hypothesis, our expanded version could do so in certain instances. If the rent-capturing proxies were significant, then we would know that public services were not being efficiently provided. However, an insignificant effect for the rent-capturing proxy would not necessarily imply that the Tiebout propositions truly were operating.
Our results indicated that, even across major cities, differences in successful rent capture by local public employees affected property prices.
We think the results strongly imply that further work needs to be done in this area. In particular, data need to be found to perform a similar study across jurisdictions within a single well-defined urban area. Also, different groups of public workers may have different rent capturing abilities. Future work should attempt to determine whether this is the case, and if so, why it is the case. Information such as this may help explain why certain localities suffer from rent-grabbing public sectors while other jurisdictions do not.
Footnotes 1See Rose-Ackerman (1983) for a thorough review of and bibliography on these literatures.
2Absentee landlords typically are assumed to eliminate complications from income effects. Competition among potential residents raises rent bids until the sum of the rent plus tax costs just equals the marginal willingness to pay to enter (all in per unit of the service terms). Land value rises because it is the discounted value of the rent payments stream.
3See Romer and Rosenthal (1979) and Denzau and Grier (19814) for more details on reversion rules and their effects on local school expenditures.
14See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) for a complete review of research on public sector labor markets and how they appear to differ from private sector markets.
5me single wage equation approach assumes that personal attributes such as education and experience have the same return in the public and private sectors. This need not be true if these are distinct labor markets.
Additionally, the choice of labor market may not be exogenous. If selfselection is not controlled for, wage regression coefficients can be biased.
These and other econometric problems can be addressed by employing the switching regression framework with an endogenous switching rule. Lee (1978 Lee ( , 1982 and Maddala (1983) provide outlines of the more advanced techniques.
6The services coefficients reflect similar combined references, too. We do not go into that story for space reasons. Furtner, we are assuming balanced budgets with no debt financing or intergovernmental grants--typical underlying assumptions in empirical studies of capitalization. Our interpretation is an example of the point made by Linneman (1978) that tax (and spending) coefficients almost certainly represent more than just capitalization of' tax (or spending) differentials across jurisdictions. If intergovernmental revenues are also a relevant omitted variable, then the tax coefficient would also reflect differences in local grantsmanship abilities to some extent.
7See Leeds (1985) for a critique of Tiebout-type studies that use interregional rather than intraregional data.
8The power is low for the null hypothesis that there is successful local public sector rent seeking and residents are compensated for this through lower property prices. While a rejection of the null may not convey important information, any findings in support of the null hypothesis would be especially encouraging given that the coefficient on BR in (3) probably is biased towards zero because of our use of an interrnetropolitan city data base.
9See Tracy and Gyourko (1986, pp. 9-12 ) for a complete description of the implementation of the two-stage procedure. Including the population change variable significantly weakens the family income effect without substantially affecting the other coefficients. Neither this nor other similar specifications yielded results significantly different from those reported in Table 2 . Due primarily to the small sample size, we attempted to keep the specification as parsimonious as possible and report only (8) in Table 2. 13Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982) provide some evidence that individuals do have trouble making fine distinctions about differences between desired and actual public spending levels. Those authors had qualitative response data from surveys on whether Michigan residents desired more, less, or about the same level of spending on public education as currently existed in their districts. Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro questioned whether respondents could accurately determine whether they truly desired more or less public spending if their desired amounts were only slightly more or slightly less than the actual amount of spending taking place. They structured their estimation so that they could solve this problem. They determined that desired spending would have had to have been 1.5 times actual spending for an individual to express a preference for more spending. In a similar vein, it may be that a prospective resident cannot accurately discriminate between a deserved wage premium and undeserved rent grabbing if the observed differential is not somewhat of an outlier.
1We also ran a specification with the measured differential and its square entered on the right-hand side. Both coefficients were insignificantly different from zero. Appendix.) There is a greater probability for these cities than for the others that the measured differentials do not accurately reflect the true mean wage differential for local public employees in the relevant city. We included these cities in the regressions reported in Table 2 because we were worried about losing variance in the other variables since we started with a relatively small sample size. Further, we do not know for sure that these cities' differentials are substantially inaccurate.
Nevertheless, we did redo the regressions in Table 2 is worth noting that we calculated the wage premium measure in another way, too. We began by simply estimating via OLS two semi-log wage equations across workers in each city in the sample. The coefficient and standard error on this version of the BR variable were -0.09 and O.10, respectively. We also constructed the BR variable as a 0 -1 dummy in the same manner as with the other wage premium measure. The coefficient and standard error on this version of the BR variable were -0.12 and 0.12, respectively.
When the four small cities with very few local public worker observations are dropped from the sample and the regressions rerun on the smaller sample, the results were not significantly changed.
is even conceivable that landowners would favor rent controls as a rent splitting device although some extreme assumptions need to be imposed.
An earlier version of this paper contained a detailed example. It can be summarized in terms of Figure 3 . The case was for a city where all landownership was absentee. Note that since $X is the true willingness to pay -31-for a site, competition among potential residents guarantees that $X is what will be paid ultimately. In this case, landowners cannot credibly convince renters it is worthwhile to prevent the public bureaucracy from raising the site price. If landlords were willing to make side payments of' $B to renters if the government is recalled, the full entry price to the city would fall to $(X-B). As long as there is excess demand there will always be potential residents bidding the entry price back up to $X by rebating the side payment back through higher rents. costs may well be due to the fact that various groups, not just a single group of renters, benefit from the regulation.
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